Israel’s Master Strategist

The one-eyed general Moshe Dayan has become the iconic world figure of Israeli militarism. Dayan’s rise to international fame started during the successful Israeli Sinai Campaign against Egypt in 1956. In this Arab-Israeli War, Dayan’s tank columns smashed the Egyptian Army. Dayan’s high speed armored strike across the desert reminded scholars and the literate public of Erwin Rommel’s lightning desert campaigns during 1941-1942. This established the man with a black patch over his left eye as one of the greatest generals of all time in the global pantheon of military history. In the almost 500 page volume under review, Professor Eitan Shamir of Bar-Ilan University portrays the making of Moshe Dayan, starting from his birth in 1915 through his death in 1981. Shamir shows how, step by step, Dayan rose from a tactician to become an operational level military leader, then a strategist, and finally a politician-cum-statesman.

Shamir meticulously shows the beginning of Dayan’s career as a foot soldier against the Arabs in 1931. Dayan emphasized the tactical principles of speed, surprise, and mobility while fighting during the 1936 Arab Revolt. During 1948, when the fledgling Israel was invaded by the regular Arab armies, Dayan not only displayed tactical skill of the first order but also significant political skill while negotiating ceasefire and peace terms with the Arabs. The 1956 Campaign was Dayan’s high point in his remarkable military career. Dayan focused on speed and mobility of the armor and highlighted leading from the front. This is again one command principle which successful tank generals like Rommel and George Patton followed. Dayan during his tenure as Chief of Staff (1953-1958), and later as Minister of Defense (1967-1973), stressed mission oriented decentralized command (not fragmented command), somewhat like the Auftragstaktik which the Wehrmacht practiced. As part of this command culture, Dayan seldom showed much respect for the established chain of command which indeed alienated many of his peers and superiors. However, the soldiers and Israeli public adored Moshe, at least until the Yom Kippur War (1973).

Dayan’s detractors got their chance during the Yom Kippur War, when Israel was surprised by the Egyptian Army, which crossed the Suez Canal. Israel was suffering from what could be termed “victory disease.” The Israeli politico-military elites believed that the Egyptian Army would be unable to undertake any offensive action against the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) which had beaten them in the three preceding wars (1948, 1956, 1967). So, when the Egyptian Army, equipped with Soviet supplied tanks and surface to air missiles, destroyed the Israeli Bar Lev defense line in Sinai, the Israeli public’s anger and dismay were total. It was directed mostly against Dayan, who was hitherto seen by the public as Israel’s ‘man of destiny.’ It made little difference that not only Dayan but all of Israel’s senior politicians and generals were surprised by Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat’s offensive across the Suez Canal. Though in the end, the IDF was able to drive back the Egyptian Army across the Canal, Dayan was seen by the Israelis as one who had let them down.

Shamir shows why Dayan’s reputation among the Israelis nose-dived and never recovered. Unlike the previous wars, 1971 onwards, Defense Minister Dayan was against launching a preemptive strike against Egypt. This was because Dayan, the strategist, realized the danger of prodding the ‘Bear’ too much and further, Israel was sorely dependent on the USA for military equipment. US President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger (later Secretary of State) made clear that Israel would receive Phantom aircraft only if the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) desisted from starting a preventive war against Egypt. The belief spread among the Israelis that during the initial period of the Yom Kippur War, Dayan had lost nerve and declared that the ‘Third Temple’ was at risk. Shamir shows that it is a myth. In addition, Dayan made his position worse by not resigning until the entire Golda Meir Cabinet resigned in 1974.

Dayan, who was hailed by the common Israelis as the ‘Minister of Victory’ after the 1967 War, never recovered from being ‘Minister of Defeat’ after the 1973 War. This was despite Dayan attempting to establish a stable peace with Egypt. The statesman Dayan believed in two principals. First, Egypt being the strongest Arab power it should be neutralized by offering concessions in the Sinai Peninsula. If Israel could establish peace with Cairo, then Syria and Jordan would also fall in line. Secondly, a policy of coexistence with the Palestinian Arabs is a necessity for Israel. Dayan as Foreign Minister (1977-1979) worked tirelessly for implementing these two principles. Still, he was not able to regain his stature. This was because he deserted the Labor Party and joined Menachem Begin’s right wing Likud Party in 1977. Then again, Dayan’s political views were not as rigid and orthodox as that of the right-wing party. Nor were they as liberal as that of the Labor Party. Dayan became a political pariah in June 1981 when he launched his own separate party (Telem) which failed to make any political debut. He passed away in the same year on 16 October.

To sum up, Shamir’s voluminous Moshe Dayan is the best biography of the remarkable general-cum-politician till now. Based on a mass of Hebrew sources, the author, by providing all sides of the argument, presents a balanced picture of the enigmatic historical figure. Moshe’s life shows that he was a man of action and learnt from practical experiences rather than books. Shamir’s solid biography will remain as the standard academic work on Dayan and also on the tumultuous history of Israel for the foreseeable future.

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Our Reviewer: Dr. Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor, Department of History, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. He is the author of numerous works in military history, such as Battle for Malaya: The Indian Army in Defeat, 1941–1942, The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857 - 1947, The Indian Army in the Two World Wars, Sepoys against the Rising Sun: The Indian Army in Far East and South-East Asia, 1941–45, and many more. He previously reviewed Civil War Infantry Tactics, The Clausewitz Myth, General George S. Patton and the Art of Leadership, The Russian-Ukrainian War, 2023, and AI, Automation, and War.

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Note: Moshe Dayan is also available in hardcover and e-editions.

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