American Economic War Planning from the Civil War to the Great War

Unlike other many other books about the U.S. in the Great War, this classic takes place entirely within the continental borders of the United States, describes no combat other than impassioned debate, official communications, convoluted statements, and lies, and efforts that almost failed in the accomplishment of their mission.

Nations at war have two fronts, one where the battles are fought and the other at home where weapons of war are made. The primary emphasis of this scholarly book is upon mobilizing the American economy to support the military during WWI but the first third deals with the era from the end of the Civil War through the Spanish-American War, to the eve of WWI. The final two-thirds describe how the war was almost lost at home.

Significant differences existed between the Army and the Navy in that fifty-two-year period. The Navy modernized by converting to coal-powered steel ships with turret-mounted weapons, resulting in victory over the Spanish Navy in 1898. The Army, however, had degenerated into a frontier constabulary that was virtually ineffective and even counter-productive during the movement of troops from the US to Cuba for the war with Spain. Poor sanitation and an ineffective Medical Corps resulted in epidemics that killed far more troops than had died in combat. This led to the start of modernization of the Army, which was only partially successful by 1917.

Readers are undoubtedly familiar with the adage, paraphrased here, that amateurs think of strategy while professionals think of logistics. This book describes how the Army’s logistical organization was divided into eight bureaus, each jealous of its turf with resultant conflict over civilian control and manufacturing. By 1917 the U.S. economy, the most powerful in the world, was a complicated mechanism involving large and small manufacturing concerns, railroads, coal mining, labor, trade associations, and government agencies. Turning this economic machine from civilian production to the very different and much narrower focus of wartime demands, without statutory authority is the principal topic of almost two-thirds of the book.

Koistinen delves into incredible detail about boards, commissions, and committees that attempted to mobilize the economy, usually with quite limited success. The reader can become glassy-eyed in the process. Smaller sections within the chapters and chapter summaries would have been of significant assistance to the reader’s comprehension. While the formation of committees is mentioned, the functions of these committees are not discussed. Yet the author leaves no doubt as to which of the players were effective, which were incompetent, and those who tried but just did not make the grade.

Reading the text left me with the impression that Woodrow Wilson was not a strong leader at the helm of the mobilization effort, but rather hung back from making decisions or involvement, and only reacted when absolutely necessary. Yet in a summary chapter, the author indicates that Wilson was very much in charge and participated in the effort.

For a unique look at America's home front, Mobilizing for Modern War is of interest, although a ponderous read due to extraordinary detail that obscures the author’s message.

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