January 7, 2026: There is a debate going on in many military organizations about whether it would be better if data were centralized and kept secure from enemies, or potential enemies, or be widely distributed to units that can quickly use it. In peacetime the tendency is to centralize data so it's easier to protect. In wartime you quickly discover that centralized data is a problem waiting to be solved as rapidly as possible.

Data is a key element in warfare. Possessing, protecting, dispersing, accessing and determining who gets what, when and how are all crucial elements. Success in combat is often a matter of who is better prepared to obtain and distribute information to those who need it most. Over the last century the military has gained access to more and more sensors. Radar, sonar, radio, surveillance satellites, drones and battlefield sensors are among the increasing number of ways to obtain data.

As the military has gained more ways to obtain information, the flood of data becomes a problem if you can’t distribute it to those who need it most. Warfare has always been about getting information and then getting it to those who need it in time for the information to have an impact. Warfare has always been an information war, but currently the flood of information from so many sensors creates a mass of data that has to go somewhere. That’s the data crisis, who gets what when. There have been several efforts to deal with this problem and how it influences combat operations. In wartime this isn’t a problem because data handling methods that don’t work often gets your own people killed. In peacetime you have to suggest, argue and even pull rank to get data handled efficiently. There are existing programs that help with that. One is CALL/Center for Army Lessons Learned.

A fundamental element in improving ground operations is analyzing past battles for what went right and what went wrong. The U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned has been around since the 1980s, and U.S. commanders use it to determine what works in combat and what doesn't. This is more important than ever in the 21st century, where urban combat and counter-insurgency conflicts dominate. In urban warfare and counterinsurgency, the potential for mistakes to be made is exponentially larger than in conventional, large-scale warfare.

Instead of hogging their experts, the US Army takes the data collected and analyzed at the CALL and supplies it to allied armies in the hope these allies will use this information. This sharing is more than just a gesture of goodwill. This does not always work, especially in countries where corruption and reluctance to change makes it difficult to make changes that will improve combat effectiveness. This cultural resistance was encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan but not in Ukraine, where the Ukrainians adapted while their enemy did not.

CALL is divided into several major sections. The first collects data from previous engagements by interviewing and visiting with units in the field. This section is tasked with discovering issues and areas of needed improvement in doctrine, training and readiness. The Analysis Section deals with evaluating the data collected and assessing the methods needed to improve effectiveness and combat efficiency. Finally, the Information Integration Section is responsible for processing and distributing the suggestions and findings from the previous two departments.

CALL is sometimes seen by other branches of the Army as a group of desk-bound analysts, but their suggestions and changes implemented in counterinsurgency and urban warfare tactics played a major role in maximizing the effectiveness of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Persuading the local military to change was often less successful.

Without something like CALL, doctrine and tactics rarely change. On-site CALL operatives visited nearly every single major combat zone in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and now Ukraine. CALL personnel also spent significant time with Iraqi Special Forces and were an integral part of the development process for the country's military and police. CALL analysts also report on who is accepting and acting on their advice and who isn’t.